The battles for Monte Cassino were so dreadful, the conditions so awful, that some German soldiers wrote that they would rather be sent back to Stalingrad than continue to fight in Italy. British historian John Ellis, using primary first-person accounts, really draws out the horror and indeed the tedium of this terrible World War II campaign.
Ellis quite rightly uses as many first-hand accounts as possible, which really bring to life what these battles might have been like for the soldiers who actually had to endure them. The mountains, the freezing sleet and snow, the precipitous drops, constant artillery barrages, the pervasive threat of snipers, the lack of food, water and dry clothing and in many instances, the sheer bloody pointlessness of it all.
Layering on top of this, Ellis presents us with the general's perspective - the planned movements of men and machines, the sweep of the various strategies. These are all supported with maps showing troop movements, targets, German and Allied positions. Many of the men from high command come off as arrogant bunglers, unable to see past their own last mistake, at a cost of thousands of lives. The French command are the few who have reputations left intact from Ellis's penetrating criticism.
In many other ways, too, this book is excellently encompassing: Ellis explains the multinational aspect of this war and the part played by African and Eastern European fighters - and in many cases, the shameful post-combat treatment they received. This book also furthers the case so convincingly made by Nigel Knight in his praise-worthy piece of revisionism, Churchill: The Greatest Briton Unmasked, that the Italian campaign was an unnecessary diversion from the primary war against German fascism and achieved nothing of strategic importance. The "soft underbelly" of Europe was proven to be no such thing.
Where this otherwise commendable book slips is that there is perhaps just too much "Battalion X attacked Point 357 while Y Division attacked Point 445." Conceivably this is of interest to the armchair general but unfortunately, these numbers became meaningless through heavy repetition. The book comes alive with the names of men and rivers, the accounts of street-to-street (and sometimes, room-to-room) fighting, the evocations of the landscape, the rats bloated on the abundance of human flesh; the level of tactical detail, whilst important for the academic historian, is possibly including a superfluous level of specificity for the general reader.
In all, though, I would find it churlish to not recommend John Ellis's Cassino, The Hollow Victory: The Battle for Rome, January - June 1944. Ellis gives us the big picture and serial incompetence of Allied generalship, the atrocious conditions the Poor Bloody Infantry had to suffer and also credits German command and infantry where respect is due.