Can Intervention Work?
and over one million other books are available for Amazon Kindle .
Learn more
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 Trade In this Item for up to £2.25
Trade in Can Intervention Work?: Amnesty International Global Ethics Series for an Amazon.co.uk gift card of up to £2.25, which you can then spend on millions of items across the site. Plus, get an extra £5 when you trade in books worth £10 or more until June 30, 2012. Trade-in values may vary (terms apply). Find more products eligible for trade-in.
|
Frequently Bought Together
Product details
|
More About the Authors
Discover books, learn about writers, and more.
Product Description
Review
I devoured this brilliant Burkean tract at a sitting. Is it too much to hope that it will be read not just in Downing Street and the Foreign Office, but also the State Department and the White House? --Peter Oborne, The Telegraph
Product Description
Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus distil their remarkable firsthand experiences of political and military interventions into a potent examination of what we can and cannot achieve in a new era of "nation building". As they delve into the massive, military-driven efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans, the expansion of the EU, and the bloodless "colour" revolutions in the former Soviet states, the authors reveal each effort's enormous consequences for international relations, human rights and our understanding of state-building. Stewart and Knaus carefully parse the philosophies that have informed interventionism-from neoconservative to liberal imperialist-and draw on their diverse experiences in the military, non-governmental organisations and the Iraqi provincial government to reveal what we can ultimately expect from large-scale interventions and how they might best realise positive change in the world.
Inside This Book
(Learn More)
Suggested Tags from Similar Products(What's this?)Be the first one to add a relevant tag (keyword that's strongly related to this product)
|
What Other Items Do Customers Buy After Viewing This Item?
Customer Reviews
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
7 of 8 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
I came to read this book with the advantage of having served in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan with the British Army. Much of what has been written by Stewart and Gnaus chimed with my recollection of what happened in all those countries. The book is split into two essays that complement each other. Stewart answering the title of the book through the Afghan lens or 'intervention under fire' as he puts it and Gnaus through the Bosnia example. Both make clear recommendations and provide guidance on what has worked historically. Stewart's essay is somewhat highbrow, almost condescending in tone but his message is clear and damning to politicians, military leaders and the FCO alike. His essay is a passionate plea for the reintroduction of FCO country specialists similar to the Political Officers during the Great Game. His opinion of the British military hierarchy makes one wonder whether they are taught anything on the Higher Commanders' and Staff Course. Gnaus writes an altogether more readable essay that fundamentally argues that interventions can work but only under very specific circumstances, neither of which we can see in Iraq or Afghanistan. Should military, Development and Foreign Office experts read this? Absolutely. Will they? Doubtful. This is a must read for all serious people involved in intervention activities and should be read alongside Sir Hilary Synnott's 'Bad Days in Basra' and Richard North's 'Ministry of Defeat'. These are all powerful critiques of a recent foreign policy that one could suggest is just as poorly refined as the introduction of Snatch Landrovers to Iraq. Gripping, thought provoking and sometimes embarrassing, this is an excellent way for Amnesty International to start its new series of essays.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
I think it is fair to use that statement as my headline. One of the authors quotes David Edelstein who found that out of 26 military occupations since 1815 only seven succeeded. That's one hell of a record. If you read this book you will understand why intervention is such an unsuccessful venture.
The first essay by Rory Stewart focuses on Afghanistan with bits and pieces of Iraq thrown in. Having read the 89 pages I found myself rather disillusioned because one is left with the impression that the intervention in Afghanistan is and was a complete waste of time, money and above all people from beginning to end (if an end is indeed in sight). ISAF ought to be wondering more about `why are we here' because they seem to be treading water virtually since Day 1.
The civilian administrators are no doubt fair-minded and high-minded in the pursuit of their projects, the implementation of which is rather incomplete, or maybe non-existent is a better word. Also, none of them appear to be concerned about the actual needs of the Afghan people and the essay gives the impression that they are not eager to find out what these may be.
I think it is fair to say that Afghanistan would be better off without these `interventionists'.
The second essay by Gerald Knaus deals with the Balkan wars and with the intervention by NATO and the European Union (EU). I found this a bit harder reading than the first essay because I thought it was inconclusive. On one hand, the author shows how successful the intervention in the Balkans turned out, but on the other hand I also felt that future success depends on the `foreign administration' to continue indefinitely. It will be interesting to see whether the administrator can relinquish his office after all these states have become members of the EU.
What I liked about the piece by Gerald Knaus is that it gives a lot of background information on the subject of intervention in general. What I also liked is that both essays begin with a timeline detailing the events. If you know your history most of these dates will not be unfamiliar and if you don't it is a useful summary of the main events.
I agree with other reviewers here that the book is both thought provoking and embarrassing. Maybe it will not be widely read, but it should be compulsory reading for interventionists although I doubt whether these people will learn anything useful from it. And that is a real pity.
The first essay by Rory Stewart focuses on Afghanistan with bits and pieces of Iraq thrown in. Having read the 89 pages I found myself rather disillusioned because one is left with the impression that the intervention in Afghanistan is and was a complete waste of time, money and above all people from beginning to end (if an end is indeed in sight). ISAF ought to be wondering more about `why are we here' because they seem to be treading water virtually since Day 1.
The civilian administrators are no doubt fair-minded and high-minded in the pursuit of their projects, the implementation of which is rather incomplete, or maybe non-existent is a better word. Also, none of them appear to be concerned about the actual needs of the Afghan people and the essay gives the impression that they are not eager to find out what these may be.
I think it is fair to say that Afghanistan would be better off without these `interventionists'.
The second essay by Gerald Knaus deals with the Balkan wars and with the intervention by NATO and the European Union (EU). I found this a bit harder reading than the first essay because I thought it was inconclusive. On one hand, the author shows how successful the intervention in the Balkans turned out, but on the other hand I also felt that future success depends on the `foreign administration' to continue indefinitely. It will be interesting to see whether the administrator can relinquish his office after all these states have become members of the EU.
What I liked about the piece by Gerald Knaus is that it gives a lot of background information on the subject of intervention in general. What I also liked is that both essays begin with a timeline detailing the events. If you know your history most of these dates will not be unfamiliar and if you don't it is a useful summary of the main events.
I agree with other reviewers here that the book is both thought provoking and embarrassing. Maybe it will not be widely read, but it should be compulsory reading for interventionists although I doubt whether these people will learn anything useful from it. And that is a real pity.
5 of 7 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
Unlike the other reviewer, I got more enjoyment from Rory Stewart's essay. I suppose he can come over as patronising, but then his experience is rather extraordinary. He was brought up in the Far East, his father being a World War II vet still on active service. Rory himself had a brief military career before a period of work for the Foreign Office, notably being governor of an Iraqi province in 2003. He also famously walked alone across many Asian countries including Afghanistan in 2002 (during winter), and has spent several years with the wise guys at Harvard. He is now a Tory MP.
His essay is basically about the experience in Afghanistan, arguing that the devil is in the detail and he paints a frightening picture of how the US dominated mission have a standardised view of how to `fix' any country, the local details being more or less insignificant. Their health and safety procedures are so all-pervasive that most visitors and even some people who work in Afghanistan never leave the bases.
Stewart contrasts this with the way things were done in the nineteenth century, but it was actually only in the nineteen eighties - when so much changed - that the CIA started to dismantle their network of old-fashioned `spies' and started worrying about political correctness instead.
The other essay I found less interesting and actually difficult to penetrate, but it left me thinking that the fundamental difference between say the intervention in Bosnia, which Stewart and Knaus support, and the one in Afghanistan which they don't, comes down to the character of the chief instigator and the underlying intention.
Whether we like it or not most politicians are careerists, and they follow their leader. A new leader with a new philosophy therefore automatically creates a climate change.
The intervention in Bosnia was a peace-keeping mission, not an exercise in empire building, which in truth was what was going on in Iraq and fundamentally in Afghanistan. The words are one thing, and in Clinton's case there was some relationship between the words and the truth. This did not apply to Iraq and Afghanistan where the intention if not the propaganda was to impose the will of the USA on Asia for the foreseeable future.
The change in philosophy explains a lot of the mistakes which were made.
This is a thought provoking book, which as the other reviewer says may not be read by many people. Most people seem to think either that all interventions are bad or that all interventions are good.
His essay is basically about the experience in Afghanistan, arguing that the devil is in the detail and he paints a frightening picture of how the US dominated mission have a standardised view of how to `fix' any country, the local details being more or less insignificant. Their health and safety procedures are so all-pervasive that most visitors and even some people who work in Afghanistan never leave the bases.
Stewart contrasts this with the way things were done in the nineteenth century, but it was actually only in the nineteen eighties - when so much changed - that the CIA started to dismantle their network of old-fashioned `spies' and started worrying about political correctness instead.
The other essay I found less interesting and actually difficult to penetrate, but it left me thinking that the fundamental difference between say the intervention in Bosnia, which Stewart and Knaus support, and the one in Afghanistan which they don't, comes down to the character of the chief instigator and the underlying intention.
Whether we like it or not most politicians are careerists, and they follow their leader. A new leader with a new philosophy therefore automatically creates a climate change.
The intervention in Bosnia was a peace-keeping mission, not an exercise in empire building, which in truth was what was going on in Iraq and fundamentally in Afghanistan. The words are one thing, and in Clinton's case there was some relationship between the words and the truth. This did not apply to Iraq and Afghanistan where the intention if not the propaganda was to impose the will of the USA on Asia for the foreseeable future.
The change in philosophy explains a lot of the mistakes which were made.
This is a thought provoking book, which as the other reviewer says may not be read by many people. Most people seem to think either that all interventions are bad or that all interventions are good.
Would you like to see more reviews about this item?
Were these reviews helpful?
Let us know
Customer Discussions
|
This product's forum
Active discussions in related forums
Search Customer Discussions
|
Related forums
|
Listmania!
|
|
Look for similar items by category
Look for similar items by subject
Feedback
- Would you like to update product info or give feedback on images?
- I am the Author, and I want to comment on my book.
- I am the Publisher, and I want to comment on this book.
|
