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14 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Superb, 5 Dec 2008
This is an excellent book, highly recommended to anyone wishing to place the current US/UK military involvement into historical context.
David Loyn puts his years of experience as a BBC foreign correspondent to good use in identifying parallels between the Taliban fighters of today and their 19th century predecessors, the Ghazis. Throughout the book he highlights numerous political and military events that have been repeated and it is frightening to read the number of quotes from centuries past which could so easily be applied to the current conflict - one can't help feeling the modern generation of politicians and military commanders have learnt little from their forerunners' mistakes.
Foreign involvement in Afghanistan has often appeared focused on the short term and so it will be interesting to see if the US/UK have the long term planning, political and moral determination to impose their view of democracy on a reluctant Afghan nation. Or will Rudyard Kipling, who knew the North West Frontier so well in an earlier time, be correct in saying that the cheaper man with his ten rupee jezail (probably an AK47 today)will prevail?
This really is an excellent book and provides valuable insight into the British Army's current action as well as an honest and fair appraisal of the complex nature of the Afghan people.
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2 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Conventional account of the wars in Afghanistan, 15 Jan 2009
David Loyn, a foreign correspondent with the BBC, has written a useful account of Afghanistan's history from the first British envoy in 1808, through the three Anglo-Afghan Wars (1838-42, 1878-81 and 1919), the 1978 revolution and the subsequent interventions, to the US-led invasion and occupation since 2001.
In 1839, the Afghan people inflicted on the British state its worst defeat in 200 years of empire in Asia. As Loyn notes, `This disastrous war' was `a story of political miscalculation, hard reality against vain hope, humiliation after hubris'. In 1842, Britain's `Army of Retribution' killed thousands of civilians in Kabul in an `orgy of destruction ... slaughter and rape'.
From 1850 to 1900 the British state sent punitive expeditions to the North-West Frontier, whose method was `butcher and bolt'. As Rudyard Kipling boasted, "a white man's head must be paid with heads five-score."
When Afghanistan had a decent government in the late 1970s, the CIA aided `an insurgency led by rural landlords ... against democracy, progress, the education of girls and godless communism'. Loyn quotes from the well-known interview given to `Le Nouvel Observateur' by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, but omits his admission that the USA intervened in Afghanistan well before the Soviet Union did so: "According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujehadin began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul." Instead, Loyn peddles the conventional lie that `in early 1980' President Carter ordered the CIA to start covert operations there.
Loyn writes of the British state's appalling role in the 1980s war, "They would also take direct action. The CIA operative who ran the war, Gust Avrakatos, said the Brits had `a willingness to do jobs that I could not touch. They basically took care of the "How to Kill People Department".' At a time when the CIA was facing strong criticism for providing an `assassination manual' to gangs in Nicaragua, this British support filled a useful gap."
Now, there is no security or development in Afghanistan. Loyn notes, `the shallow roots of democracy, the depths of corruption, the weakness of the aid effort, and the growing violence'. Yet in June 2008, Chief of Defence Staff Sir Jock Stirrup foolishly said that Afghanistan would not be `that long-term an endeavour for the military'. The British government has already sent too many to kill and die in vain: nobody ever gains, or gains from, Afghanistan.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
An excellent canter across 170 years of history, 3 Nov 2009
Very relevant to today's problems in Asia - very sobering, but a very lively read which lays out most of the key factors at play in Afghanistan and Pakistan with clarity. An excellent read.
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