The British Idealists (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) [Paperback]

The British Idealists were a group of philosophers whose ideas were dominant for about fifty years in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century. David Boucher has drawn on the works of its leading exponents and placed them in the context of three categories. The Idealist philosophy of Henry Jones, Andrew Seth, Bernard Bosanquet and D G Ritchie are categorised within "Evolution and Society". Political theories of "Individualism, Collectivism and the General Will" include the same authors (with the exception of Seth) to which are added F H Bradley, J.S.Mackenzie and Edward Caird. The final section on "The State and International Relations" includes T H Green, J H Muirhead, John Watson and, as befits his status in Idealism, Bernard Bosanquet.

British philosophy was traditionally based on empiricism which many nineteenth century thinkers considered had become moribund. British Idealism had its origins in the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. They agreed with Hegel in rejecting all dualisms, "including Kant's distinction between things in themselves and things as they are experienced by the knowing mind." For Hegel the only concrete idea was that of the Absolute which was revealed in history and understood by using the dialetical method. In the Hegelian scheme the Absolute represented the concept of God re-stated in a non-personal manner. According to Absolute Idealism the real is rational. British Idealists accepted this claim but rejected the dialetical method as a means of understanding reality. This led Jones to accuse Bosanquet and Bradley of positing an Absolute that was ultimately beyond experience and which failed "to overcome the dualism between appearance and reality".

Whereas Hegel did not believe philosophy had a contribution to make to practical life, most British Idealists considered "philosophy was integrally related to practical advice and needed to improve the condition of society." Idealism covered a range of subjects but it was its political and social philosophy which proved to be the most permanent feature. They rejected the theory that man and the State were in opposition to each other, arguing "the enabling State could provide opportunities that were beyond the imagination of unregulated enterprise." The role of professional philosophers was "to identify and articulate the sources the sources of injustice and depravity and campaign for reform". Idealism was successful because it opposed the excessive individualism of Spencer, resisted the claims of naturalism, emphasised the unity of nature and spirit and placed God at the centre of the process of social realisation. This was qualified by distinguishing between the original sacred texts and the creeds which had developed over the centuries, including the tendency to think of God in finite terms.

While Darwin expressed his theory of evolution by natural selection "in as mild and unprovocative a manner as he could muster, taking care to avoid directly the subject of Genesis and the origin of humanity" his theory denied that each species was independently created and claimed that man and other animals had a common ancestor. "This constituted a denial of the absolute distinction between Nature and Spirit, or animal and human nature" which reached the popular consciousness through the writings of Spencer who changed Darwin's "struggle for existence" into the "survival of the fittest". Ironically, it was Huxley who suggested the evolution of Nature and moral evolution were two different processes. Morality arose as a consequence of the interaction of humans with each other and the development of conscience within the evolutionary process. Jones argued there was a clear division between the naturalistic processes and rational moral thought. Nature cannot think but simply provides "the data which intelligence interprets". Mind and nature are interdependent on each other and neither can exist without the other. Ritchie evoked Aristotle's dictum "that the true nature of a thing is to be found not in its origin but in its end." Thus development should be read backwards not forwards. On that basis evolution endorses religious experience and is "another name for the development of Spirit."

Idealists believed society was more than the aggregate of individuals implied in Spencer's concept of society as a biological or mechanical organism. They portrayed it as an inter-dependent organism in which, "the person is realised in the whole and the whole realises itself through the person." Thus the Benthamite idea of the State as promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number failed to identify the difference between the State as "the totality of the common consciousness of a people or a nation and the purposes it embodies" and its role as the representative of the general will. The role of the State was to sustain individual rights from which Idealists concluded that if a law was at odds with a person's conscience it must be disobeyed at any cost.

Idealists were committed to the idea of positive State intervention to improve social conditions. However, they were not agreed on the level of State intervention required. Spencerian Individualism regarded the State and individual liberty as antithetical and regarded socialism as an attempt to extend the power of the State in social matters. Idealists argued that while the State is not itself moral it could remove obstacles to individual self-realisation and encourage, rather than weaken, self-reliance. British Idealists had no time for Marxism preferring ethical socialism to Marxist determinism. Idealism was an "intensely moralistic and judgemental philosophy condemning all social evils." Although Idealism was subject to philosophical attacks from Moore, Russell and the emergence of analytical philosophy as the dominant force in British philosophy, it was external factors which led to the decline of Idealism. The First World War resulted in the collapse of Liberal values and with it Idealism.

Boucher has provided a source book rather than a textbook. It's an excellent reference book but with limited appeal to aficionados of philosophy rather than the general reader. A book for library borrowing rather than purchase. From that perspective three stars is appropriate.