Boulogne (Battleground Europe) [Paperback]

Boulogne consists of nine chapters, beginning with background sections on the 1940 campaign, the 20th Guards Brigade and the 2nd Panzer Division. Although the maps provided by the author adequately depict the dispositions of the 20th Guards Brigade, they do not depict either French or German dispositions. Furthermore, key terrain features like Fort de la Creche and the Haute Ville cathedral are not depicted on the maps. The photographs are excellent, and Cooksey provides a number of photos from private British and German collections. After the battle narrative, the author also provides three guided tours around the Boulogne battlefield. A brief bibliography is provided, but unfortunately no order of battle.

One of the most striking features about Boulogne is the shocking waste of two fine battalions of infantry. The two battalions were formed in the summer of 1939 and although they spent the entire Phoney War period on ceremonial duties in England, the troops were considered of high quality. The battalions began intensive infantry training in May 1940 and were still in the process of receiving all their equipment, such as French-made 25mm anti-tank guns. When the German Blitzkrieg threatened the Channel ports, the decision was rapidly made to dispatch this brigade to secure Boulogne. The brigade had less than 24 hours to deploy from home station - apparently the unit did not have a deployment plan in hand - and much vital equipment was left behind. The brigade deployed to Boulogne with virtually no vehicles, no mortars, no mines or barbed wire, no radios, few maps, only a few entrenching tools and only fifty rounds of ammunition per riflemen. Essentially, the unit could barely shoot, move and communicate. After arriving in Boulogne on the morning of 22 May 1940, the brigade was hastily thrown into an incomplete cordon around the edges of the city. Cooksey makes the point that there was little time or effort spent on coordinating the brigade's defense with local French troops or the numerous British support troops in the port. The brigade's flimsy defense repelled the initial German probes on 22 May, but was quickly pushed in by determined attacks on 23 May. When the order came to evacuate the brigade, many troops were left behind due to the lack of radios; of 1,600 troops landed, more than 500 were lost.

Cooksey's account is also interesting for the information he provides from the German perspective. It is apparent that the fog of war affected the Germans as well, since they were not completely aware of the British evacuation or the true plight of the brigade. Furthermore, the rapid German advance had strung the German units out badly; the 2nd Panzer lacked much of its infantry at Boulogne and had to conduct an attack into an urban area with a tank-heavy force supported by only a battalion of motorcycle troops and some reconnaissance units. The Germans were quickly able to smash in the British defense on the outskirts of the town but their attack bogged down in the urban congestion of Boulogne; it took the Germans three days to mop up the last defenders.

The author's description of the heroic evacuation of the brigade by a flotilla of Royal Navy destroyers is quite thrilling. Braving intense small arms fire and even tank gunfire, these intrepid ships pushed into the narrow harbor and extracted thousands of Allied troops. One destroyer captain was killed by sniper fire and several destroyers were damaged by air attack and coastal artillery. Cooksey's description of the final hours of the evacuation is well-written and intense. At one point, British destroyers were engaging German tanks less than 300 meters from the docks. It is also apparent that the French units in Boulogne put up an incredible defense of the city - there was no lack of will to fight in those French troops. Although Cooksey describes the last-ditch French defense after the British withdrawal, it is more difficult to follow these actions due to the lack of maps.

The British lost 30% of the 20th Guards Brigade in Boulogne and failed to hold the port for more than 36 hours. However, in unilaterally evacuating the brigade without consulting the French - who continued to resist for two more days - Churchill angered his ally. Consequently, the other Brigade deployed to Calais was not evacuated in order to display "allied solidarity" and that unit was overwhelmed.
Together, Boulogne and Calais demonstrate the high cost of rashly throwing units into poorly-defined situations and then hoping for the best.