Bitter Glory: Poland and Its Fate 1918 to 1939 [Paperback]

Richard M. Watt tells the fascinating story of how the Poles, divided between German, Russian and Austrian territory prepared themselves so that they we able to achieve from the wreckage of the first world war the independence which they had lost as a result of the Third Partition of Poland at the close of the eighteenth century. For this achievement much of the credit must go to Jozef Pilsudski who lead Polish forces to a decisive victory against the Red army in 1920. Freedom fighter, army commander, sometime prime minister and Marshal of Poland, Pilsudski dominated Poland until his death in 1935. Although he declined to become president, even after his coup in 1926, it was virtually impossible for any Polish government (and there were many in this period) to take any significant decision without Pilsudski's approval. Yet, at a time when much of Europe fell under the spell of dictators, and notwithstanding the changes to the Polish constitution made in his name which certainly swung strongly towards the autocratic, Pilsudski, admired by Poland's jews and Hilter alike, was a believer in democracy albeit that he despaired of the greed and incompetence of the politicians of the time. Yet despite this Poland did achieve much. Significant progress was made in industrial development, land reform, education, and tackling rural backwardness so that by 1939, despite the factional strife, Poland had become a major European power able to hold its own against both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

And therein lay the tragedy.... Because, of course, for all the achievements - and they were considerable - Poland's position was in reality much weaker in the late 1930s than those in government whose perceptions were formed in the triumphant years following the first world war realised. Leaving aside the considerable material achievements the one problem the Polish governing class was unable to conquer was the collective character flaw which manifest itself in the tendency toward obstinacy, resistance to compromise and a lack of political acumen.

This first manifest itself at the peace conference in Paris in 1919 when Paderewski's complaints about the treatment Poland was receiving from the Allies (who did not share Poland's belief that the 1772 borders was the appropriate starting point for Poland's re-constituted borders) earmed from Lloyd George the rebuke that Poland was seeking to annex the territory of other nations and to impose on the them the very tyranny that the Poles themselves had endured for years. The Polish inspired agitation and intimidation in Silesia before the plebiscite in 1921 was to find a sinsister echo in the Sudetenland in 1938. The "control of foregn passports" aimed at causing Polish jews in Germanyto loose their right to return to Poland played right into the Nazi's hands and culminated in the Kristalnacht atrtrocities in Germany. By incorporating large parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine within the new borders Poland acquired territory it could not defend home to an essentially hostile population - as Polish soldiers retreating to safety in Romania in September 1939 were to discover to their cost. A smaller Poland might well have been a safer Poland.

Poland failed to realise that the manner in which its foreign policy was conducted under Pilsudski and Beck was abrasive and overly agressive and lead to serious tactical errors and miscalculations. For example, Poland mistook the German response to the Polish inspired Wichter incident in Danzig in 1932 as a triumphant example of Poland's new found strength - it did not occur to the goverment that the Germany might simply be biding its time. The non-agression declaration with Germany undermined the resolution of the French government to resist Hilter. Poland's renunciation of the Minorities Treay undermined the league of Nations at a critical time. The 1938 ultimatum to Czechoslovakia and its armed seizure of Teschen in 1939 was a gross error which gave the impression that Poland was either in league with Germany or has a sense of international morality that was not much different from that of Nazi Germany. In essence, as Watt demonstrates, Poland pursued a foreign policy that was "too clever by half".

With the benefit of hindsight and despite Polish views to the contrary, it is clear that notwithstanding the rather half-hearted action of Great Britain and France in coming to Poland's assistance once they had declared war on Germany, nothing could have saved Poland from the combined effects of German and Soviet agression and the "fourth" partition of Poland. A rather more interesting question is whether, had the Poland been able to reach a pre-Munich alliance with Czechoslovakia and had it been able to put aside the hatreds of the past, a formidable defensive combination might not have been created which would not only have prolonged the existence of both countries but might well have encouraged a more effective international response to Hitler a time when he could have been stopped. Certainly such an act might well have elevated Poland to authentic great power status.

Whatever the view one takes of the value of any agreement with the Soviet Union at that time, Poland did miss a number of opportunities both before the war in terms of a defensive alliance against Germany and during the war (to the exasperation of Churchill) in terms of the revised Polish borders after the war and the composition of its post war goverment which would have given Poland something even if it was less than everything Poland expected.

The tragedy is that the Poles' inability to agree with their neighbours, their friends (or their enemies) and amongst themselves when given the opportunity resulted in their not being heard when vital decisions were later being made without them. Read more ›