Erich Fromm's Beyond the Chains of Illusion is a book half-way between being a discussion of Marx and Freud and being Fromm's autobiography. As such, it is probably primarily of interest to those interested in Fromm, although its discussion of Marx and Freud is insightful enough to make it worthwhile reading for those interested in them (but don't expect a scholarly work, if you buy it - there was no bibliography or index in the edition I read.) One of the things I most enjoyed about it was Fromm's rejection of the cliche that compares Marx's importance to that of Freud: Fromm declares "That Marx is a figure of world historical significance with whom Freud cannot even be compared in this respect hardly needs to be said", and insists that Marx is a superior thinker to Freud as well. I do not agree with Fromm's Marxism and nor I do necessarily agree with his evaluation of the relative merits of Marx and Freud as thinkers. Fromm happens to be perfectly right that Marx and Freud are in no way comparable as historical figures, however, and his comments about that issue are more honest than might be expected from a Freudian Marxist.
Fromm is often dismissed as an intellectual lightweight. I'm happy to report that Fromm shows greater caution and skepticism than many another Freudian Marxist; this trait is his chief virtue. Regarding the question of whether societies can be sick or disturbed in the same sense that individuals can be, and whether psychoanalysis could usefully diagnose such social aliments, Fromm observes, "I would not say that such an attempt to apply psychoanalysis to civilized society would be fanciful or doomed to fruitlessness. But it behooves us to be very careful, not to forget that after all we are dealing only with analogies, and that it is dangerous, not only with men but also with concepts, to drag them out of the region where they originated and have matured." Fromm's caution about such matters is not matched by skill at philosophical argument, however, as shown by his inadvertently amusing discussion of the unconscious. He avers that, "The term 'the unconscious' is actually a mystification...There is no such thing as the unconscious; there are only experiences of which we are aware, and others of which we are not aware, that is, of which we are unconscious. If I hate a man because I am afraid of him, and if I am aware of my hate but not of my fear, we may say that my hate is conscious and that my fear is unconscious; still, my fear does not lie in that mysterious place: 'the' unconscious." One answer might be, why not? Fromm neglects to explain how it makes sense to say that hate can lie in consciousness or why consciousness is less "mysterious" than the unconscious. By altering a few key words in Fromm's argument against "the unconscious", one could turn it into an argument against "consciousness", one that would be formally identical to Fromm's actual argument and equally convincing or unconvincing.