or
Sign in to turn on 1-Click ordering.
More Buying Choices
Have one to sell? Sell yours here
Sorry, this item is not available in
Image not available for
Colour:
Image not available

 
Tell the Publisher!
Id like to read this book on Kindle

Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.

Arming against Hitler (Modern War Studies) [Paperback]

Eugenia C. Kiesling
3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
RRP: 11.77
Price: 11.68 & FREE Delivery in the UK. Details
You Save: 0.09 (1%)
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Usually dispatched within 2 to 3 weeks.
Dispatched from and sold by Amazon. Gift-wrap available.

Formats

Amazon Price New from Used from
Hardcover --  
Paperback 11.68  

Book Description

Dec 1996 Modern War Studies
In May-June 1940 the Germans demolished the French Army, inflicting more than 300,000 French casualties, including more than 120,000 dead. While many historians have focused on France's failure to avoid this catastrophe, Kiesling is the first to show why the French had good reason to trust that their prewar defense policies, military doctrine, and combat forces would preserve the nation. Kiesling argues that France's devastating defeat was a consequence neither of blindness to the German military threat nor of paralysis in the face of it. Grimly aware of the need to prepare for another war with its arch enemy, French leaders created defense preparations and military doctrines in which they felt confident. Rather than simply focusing on what went wrong, Kiesling examines the fundamental logic of French defense planning within its cultural, institutional, political, and military contexts. In the process, she provides much new material about the inner workings of the French military, its relations with civilian leaders, its lack of adaptability, and its overreliance on an army reserve that was poorly organized, trained, and led. Ultimately, she makes a persuasive case for France's defense options and offers a useful warning about the utility of the "lessons of history." The lesson for contemporary policymakers and strategists, Kiesling suggests, is not that the French made mistakes but that nations and armies make policy and strategy under severe constraints. Her study forcefully reminds us how hindsight can blind us to the complexities of preparing for every next war.

Product details

  • Paperback: 276 pages
  • Publisher: University Press of Kansas (Dec 1996)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0700611096
  • ISBN-13: 978-0700611096
  • Product Dimensions: 1.5 x 15 x 22.5 cm
  • Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Bestsellers Rank: 1,818,627 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • See Complete Table of Contents

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, and more.

Sell a Digital Version of This Book in the Kindle Store

If you are a publisher or author and hold the digital rights to a book, you can sell a digital version of it in our Kindle Store. Learn more

Customer Reviews

5 star
0
3 star
0
2 star
0
3.0 out of 5 stars
3.0 out of 5 stars
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful
By A Customer
Format:Hardcover
In a closely argued and meticulously researched monograph,
Eugenia Kiesling argues that French military preparations
prior to WWII were deficient not because of bad doctrine or
slovenly preparation, but because of basic political and
economic constraints that made it difficult (if not impossi-
ble) to keep up with their much more numerous German
neighbors. For a close study of exactly what went wrong in
France in 1940 and why, this is essential reading for the
student of the Second World War.
Comment | 
Was this review helpful to you?
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Very good study 20 Mar 2010
Format:Paperback
An excellent account of the reasons behind the equipment and doctrine of the French army of 1940, and, by the same token, the reasons for defeat.
Comment | 
Was this review helpful to you?
1 of 4 people found the following review helpful
1.0 out of 5 stars Not so good 18 April 1999
By A Customer
Format:Hardcover
In 1940 using a plan designed by General Manstien Germany attacked France. The campaign cut off the French from their Belgian and English Allies who were forced to retreate or surrender. Germany was then left to conquer a much reduced opposition.
At the time it was thought that Germany outnumbered the allies and had vastly superior weapons. After the war it was found that the allies in fact outnumbered the Germans and that most German weapons were either inferior to or at most equal to the allied.
This book tries to argue that the preparations made by France were a factor in the French defeat. It is hard to show that this was the case. The book parallels a debate which took place in German conentration camps during the war. The French Military tried to put the government on trial for betraying the nation and letting France be defeated. Blum the prime minister of France was able to show how he had given the army everything that it wanted.
France lost the war not because of the size of its armies or the weapons it had but because of the stupidity of its military leaders.
The book simply fails to look at France in the context of German rearmament. If it did it would show that the French program was ratinal and adequate.
All in all not worth the money.
Comment | 
Was this review helpful to you?
Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta)
Amazon.com: 4.1 out of 5 stars  7 reviews
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Seldom considered issues in the popular history 8 Oct 2005
By Gerard A. Proudfoot - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
Many authors have written on the fall of France in 1940 but Keisling is the first to actually examine how French military structure and policy played perhaps the most significant role in the defeat. A one year conscript army and a totally untrained reserve would have made any doctrine unusable and thus made defeat likely. With an army such as that prepared by France in 1940 it is unlikely they could have made even their own version of mechanized warfare effective. This book will put paid to the arguments that the French officers paid little or no attention to mechanization, modern doctrine or were simply negligent.
12 of 15 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Politics kept France from adequately preparing for WWII 22 Sep 1996
By A Customer - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Hardcover
In a closely argued and meticulously researched monograph,
Eugenia Kiesling argues that French military preparations
prior to WWII were deficient not because of bad doctrine or
slovenly preparation, but because of basic political and
economic constraints that made it difficult (if not impossi-
ble) to keep up with their much more numerous German
neighbors. For a close study of exactly what went wrong in
France in 1940 and why, this is essential reading for the
student of the Second World War.
6 of 7 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Poor Assumptions Limit one's Ability to Effectively Plan 18 Oct 2001
By Trent Hone - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Hardcover
One of the main arguments of the book is that the French believed they had an effective, thorough, and well thought out doctrine. The fact that they did not was illustrated by the events of 1940 and the speed with which the country was overwhelmed.
Kiesling does and excellent job of presenting reasons why French doctrine was flawed, and also addresses why it was inadequately tested before the war. Numerous obstacles to the process are presented and explained in this well-researched account.
The implications of Kiesling's argument are profound. They suggest that no matter how thorough the planning and evaluation of a military doctrine, it can still be fundamentally flawed unless the assumptions underlying it are also tested.
6 of 7 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Military History at its Finest 12 Mar 2006
By Michael Slater - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
Kiesling is an impressive historian and author who has substantially increased our understanding of the nature of national security planning and warfare. She convincingly argues that France's defeat in 1940 was not inevitable. Her careful and thorough use of primary source material on the evolution of French military thought and security policy demolishes many of the most prominent myths perpetuated for over two generations on the reasons for the French defeat. Her chapters on doctrine, training, and the tyranny of the mundane should be required reading for military officers and public officials working in the US NSC, Intelligence Community, and the Department of Defense.
8 of 10 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars the best description about the French defeat in 1940 27 July 2002
By 1. - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
Kiesling main thesis is that the lack of trianing of reservist and regular officers led to an overly cautious military doctrine. The beginnning of the book describes some of the crisis facing the French military. Consrcipts were poorly trained since they only had two years worth of training. The same also applied to reservist. The French army was overly strained as to whether to devote resources to the reservists or the conscripts. The schooling that French officers received was limited to their particular branch of the armed forces and lacked any geopolitics or any overview of current military operations. To make matters worse the French army lacked any cohesion. Men in the reserves would be originally in their regional unit than transferred to an new unit based on their technical skills. As a result of this policy men lacked any time to become well adjusted to their unit. The end result of these above mentioned factors was that the French developed a doctrine that was highly centralized and overly cautious. I worked reccomend this book to read alongside James Corum's "The Roots of Blitzkrieg," in order to understand the French defeat in 1940.
Were these reviews helpful?   Let us know
Search Customer Reviews
Only search this product's reviews

Customer Discussions

This product's forum
Discussion Replies Latest Post
No discussions yet

Ask questions, Share opinions, Gain insight
Start a new discussion
Topic:
First post:
Prompts for sign-in
 

Search Customer Discussions
Search all Amazon discussions
   


Look for similar items by category


Feedback