Gerry Adams has a singular view of history predicated on the idea that Irish nationalism is a force that can do no wrong in pursuit of its desire to unite the island of Ireland. His eulogy of Joe Cahill, for example, acknowledges Cahill's physical force republicanism and claims that "there would not be a peace process today without Joe Cahill." That's true. Had not Cahill formed the Provisional IRA in 1969, imported arms from Libya, or followed his statement, "I am a gunman, talking will get us nonwhere" with murderous campaigns against civilians there would not have been any peace to process. The peace process represented the IRA's failure to win a military victory, Cahill's boast, "We've won the war, now let's win the peace" notwithstanding. One wonders why Adams has difficulty understanding why Unionists found it difficult to accept Republicans were serious about lasting peace!!
Cahill gave up physical force and supported the Good Friday agreement because murder failed and politics was the only realistic way of achieving peace in Ulster. Yet neither Cahill, nor Adams, admitted any responsibility for the 2000 deaths attributed to Republicans during the Troubles. For Adams the past is suitable only for mythologising Irish nationalism. He praises Michael Davitt but made no mention of the way Davitt's reputation had to be rescued from the sanctification of the violence of the Irish civil war. He spoke in praise of IRA volunteer Seamus Harvey, killed on his way to carry out a bombing, but made no reference to the IRA's abduction and murder of Jean McConville, one of the nine "disappeared" killed by Republicans. Adams makes no reference to any of them. His Irish eye must have a patch over it.
His feigned outrage at those who blamed the IRA for its misdeeds stands in stark contrast to his failure to follow through those incidents where the organisation's punishment squads held sway. Although he expressed sympathy for the family of Robert McCartney, there was no attempt to prevent the Republican campaign of intimidation which forced the dead man's relatives from their homes. Similarly Sinn Fein called for the releases of the murderers of Dectective Jerry McCabe. This is in line with Adam's claim that crimes are only crimes in the eyes of the State not those of Sinn Fein. Such thinking seeks to condone the murder of Robert Bradford and anaesthetise the death of Denis Donaldson. Adams' call for a judicial enquiry into the deaths of Pat Finucane, Marie Drumm and Eddie Fullerton would carry conviction were he asking for details of the murders carried out by the IRA.
Adams's monotonous repetition of the Sinn Fein party line is occasionally interrupted by personal observations. Adams's version of history is that the peace process has come about because of the sacrifices and political stands taken by Sinn Fein. As history its as truthful as saying there was freedom of speech under Stalin. Peace in Northern Ireland is only possible because paramilitaries have laid down their arms (apart from the so-called Real IRA). It wasn't the IRA who broke the united Unionist strangehold on Ulster politics it was Willie Whitelaw. The IRA and Sinn Fein drove politics to the margins (aided by Ulster paramilitaries) by pursuing a military strategy which contradicted the very notions of freedom and democracy which Adams claims he wants to see in a United Ireland. It is to his credit that he persuaded Republicans to take the political route. It is to his detriment that his arrogance prevents him from recognising his tunnel vision.
The partition of Ireland came about as a political solution to an intractable problem. Its acceptance by some Republicans led to civil war in the South of Ireland with others supporting a united Ireland. This allowed Northern Ireland to create a semblance of legitimacy not intended in the 1921 Government of Ireland Act, which considered partition a temporary not a permanent solution. Sinn Fein has a long and shameful history of supporting attempts to subjugate Northern Ireland to Republican rule. To do so they targeted ordinary British citizens on the specious grounds that they would tire of terrorism and pressurise the government into change its policies. Adams never understood that the more attacks that were made on the mainland, the more the ordinary British despised Republicanism.
The book gives a fair reflection of where Adams stands on issues and provides a guide to the partisan and self-serving nature of his views. While, in fairness, he makes the point that there is a credibility gap between fact and reality he fails to acknowledge his part in creating that gap. Neither the British nor the Irish public care about partition. It's a matter to be determined by politicians. It is regrettable that Northern Ireland politicians generally have failed to serve the interests of the whole community. Their amoral blatherings leave the British and Irish public wondering why so many in Northern Ireland still hate each other. Adams shows why Irish Republicanism still lives in the shadow of its own ficticious history while people in the real world get on with the business of living. Three stars for the book's role as the purveyor of Sinn Fein propaganda and a prejudicial account of the peace process.