America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies (Hardcover)

Friedman begins his narrative with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a nightmare development that threatened to give the Soviets control of the Persian Gulf and to lead to America's expulsion from the Middle East. The Carter Administration recognized the strategic threat and began moving quickly to assemble an Islamist guerrilla force to bog down the Soviets in their own Vietnam. The US strategy was intensified by the Reagan Administration and ultimately proved successful, but it had the side effect of convincing the Islamists that they could, if they fought hard enough, topple a superpower. The presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War did much to enrage the Islamists, convincing them that their best chance of re-establishing an Islamic caliphate lay in provoking a war with the United States.

Friedman's book explores the Byzantine details of American and Islamist Realpolitik in a fairly balanced way. He argues that the invasion of Iraq was not about WMDs or connections to Al Qaeda or even about oil, but was intended to show the Islamic world (and particularly Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) that the United States meant business and that those who didn't get with the program were going to be dealt with very harshly. The fact that the United States has substantial ground and air forces within easy striking distance of Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia, among others, has no doubt been noticed by the leaders of those countries, dampening their enthusiasm for tolerating Al Qaeda.

The details of this Realpolitik are not pretty. To facilitate the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States obtained Russia's permission to base troops in the Islamic states of the former Soviet Union--in exchange for which, America agreed to mute its criticism of Russia's excesses in Chechnya. After Islamist terrorists attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi, America secured Pakistan's reluctant cooperation in the War on Terror by making it clear that the United States wouldn't mind very much if India launched a nuclear attack on Pakistan (if America didn't launch one first). The book contains numerous other examples of why America, Iran and other countries behave in ways that are portrayed in the newspapers as peculiar, but are actually quite understandable when taken in context.

Although I think it is fair to say that Friedman is sympathetic with the Bush Administration's approach, he is not an apologist. He documents numerous strategic, tactical and intelligence failures in Iraq, not the least of which was the Administration's failure to appreciate the control that Iran exercised over Iraq's Shi'ite population. He is properly critical of the separation between the American political leadership and the soldiers: "A ruling class that sends the children of others to fight, but not their own, cannot sustain its power for very long" (339). And he concludes that, although the United States has the upper hand in the War on Terror, "the war now hangs in the balance. It is not clear who will win the war. Neither side is defeated. Neither side can give up." This is a balanced and sobering book, a must-read for anyone interested in what is really going on in the War on Terror.

His basic thesis is that the US thinking behind the current war is very far different from what we have been told, and that although the US did think there were some WMD they knew they weren't dangerous. The reason for the war was to establish major military bases in Iraq which could be used to base its operations against Al Quaeda and in particular to pressurise the Saudis into stopping Al Quaeda's funding and into giving the US the benefit of their intelligence.

The book also offers an explanation for what Al Quaeda is all about, ie the establishment of a panAsian Islamic state a la Caliphate, and says anti-American feeling developed after their abandonment of the Mujahideen after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended, with collusion from the Arab states the mujahideen came from, who didn't want their wild boys back; and also after Desert Storm as the Wahabi faithful really didn't like US forces feeling too familiar in the middle east.

The book goes on to offer detailed analysis of how Al Quaeda operate, what they knew and didn't know, and gives an impressive picture of all the military and intelligence moves of the US and the different ideas about strategy. It basically explains that the US have done a huge amount of thinking and planning about Al Quaeda, almost none of which has been made public. This when you think about it is logical, and its interesting to read a joined up version of how it went down.

The book is impressive but not wholly convincing. It says the US only decided to invade Iraq in 2002 when it ran into problems with the Saudis, whereas there's clear evidence that Bush made invasion of Iraq a number one priority immediately he took office in 2000. See Ron Suskind's book about Paul Hughes for details. It paints a rather depressing picture of a Machiavellian world of international politics which however seems just a bit too neat and tidy.

It also seems to have been written in a hurry, and I don't go along with Friedman's description of Britain in 1600 as a land of savages! One hopes the information on which he bases his book is a bit sounder than that. Hardly any sources are given throughout the book.

Nevertheless this seems like an invaluable contribution to understanding the new world order after the end of the cold war.