Written by two experts on Cold War history, this very readable volume is a nice overview of America's role in the Cold War. Contrary to what some other reviewers claim, this is not a radical new interpretation of the Cold War and largely reflects what appears to be a broad consensus among scholars of the Cold War. Logevall and Campbell, not surprisingly, do emphasize some features and interpretations of specific events and trends, but I don't think there is anything in this book which constitutes a fundamental effort at revision.
This is not an overview history of the Cold War but focuses on American actions, American motivations, and the American experience of the Cold War. The authors adopt an "intermestic" view of the Cold War, specifically examining the many linkages and interactions between American international policy and domestic politics. In common with quite a few other scholars, they see the dynamics of American politics, often only loosely linked to international realities, as a major feature of the Cold War and in particular, as a major determinant of US policies.
Logevall and Campbell present the Cold War not as an inevitable conflict between 2 powers competing for world domination. With WWII, the USA was faced with the reality that it no longer benefited from "free security" due to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As the USA emerged from WWII, it was clearly the most powerful nation and American policy makers set out to develop an international system the would protect American security and based on a preponderance of American power. Stalin's deeply wounded Soviet Union, in contrast, is presented as a relatively conservative and defensive state, aiming to preserve its autarchy and security but not fundamentally aggressive. To both rebuff Soviet opportunism, prevent the emergence of threatening governments in Western Europe and Japan, and maintain American preponderance, the USA implemented the containment policy of responding to apparent Soviet aggression and bolstering democratic states in Europe and Japan. As the authors show, these policies were imaginative, demanding, and ultimately quite effective.
Containment, however, was accompanied embedding of the Cold War in American society with the development across the 1950s of the military-industrial complex and Cold War issues becoming prominent in American electoral politics. Across the 1950s and 1960s, American commitments and investment in the Cold War increased dramatically, often driven by domestic concerns and political calculations rather than objective security needs. The enormous arms race, neglect of diplomacy, and expansion across the globe became persistent features of American policy. The authors argue that the containment policy was essentially successful by the 1950s and that the nuclear arms race had stabilized, in American favor, by the early 1960s. The bipolar nature of the Cold War, the dynamics of American politics, and the existence of nuclear weapons, however, prolonged the Cold War well beyond its logical end.
As Logevall and Craig point out, the prolonged Cold War had significant adverse consequences both for the USA and especially for 3rd world nations which often became proxy battlegrounds for the USA and Soviet Union. The authors cover the end of the Cold War quite well, with nuanced discussions of the roles of Gorbachev and Reagan. As most other serious scholars of this conclude, the popular triumphalist view of Reagan era America crushing the Soviet Union is clearly wrong though Reagan receives his just due for truly stateman-like behavior in becoming Gorbachev's interlocutor.
The conclusion of this book is particularly good, providing a nice assessment of the successes and failures of American policy. The authors particularly stress the costs of the Cold War with the enormous waste of American resources, the destructive nature of proxy wars and its lasting distortions of the American political system. As Melvyn Leffler wrote, we had to fight the Cold War, but we didn't have to fight it so hard. It should be mentioned, however, that the Cold War had some very beneficial fallout. Ostensible American defense of democratic values abroad probably helped the Civil Rights movement and fear of the Soviet Union was a huge stimulus for Federal investment in science and education.