Field Marshall Montogomery's first lesson from the 'Book of War' was 'Don't march on Moscow'. His second should have been 'Don't meddle with Afghanistan', and this book shows why. Braithwaite was British ambassador in Moscow for much of the time that the Russians were fighting there, so was not only in a position to see the effects first hand, but also to track down the history of the combatants, for his crucial chapters on how the returning Russian soldiers were treated. Although he avoids the temptation to make direct comparisons between the Russian experience and the difficulties being undergone by the current western allies, they are so obvious as to barely need pointing out. So too are the comparisons between what the Russians attempted to put in place by way of training and nation building to allow them a dignified exit, and what our 'International Security Assistance Force' is trying to do now.
What is different is the motivations of the leading players. It is clear from Braithwaite's account of the politburo meetings leading up to the Soviet invasion that the Russians were determined to stay out. But they were driven by ideological imperatives to give support, and then to intervene directly. All the time, though, there was the sense that they were on a hiding to nothing, and as the casualties mounted and the burning of villages increased, so the war became ever less winnable. But at the same time, the truth could not be told to the Russian people, so we learn how the bodies of casualties were shipped home to be delivered to their families during the hours of darkness, together with instructions to say nothing.
It is in his descriptions of the 'Home Front' - in the way that returning soldiers found themselves faced with indifference in the middle of a disintegrating Soviet Union, deprived of recognition, aid, or benefit, that Braithwaite touches on the human, tragic, side of this encounter, and provides clear insight into how this affected subsequent events in Russia.
This is far from being a dry, academic work, but equally it is a little more scholarly than much of what is branded as 'narrative history.' It is not really a history of events - although timelines are clear - and is sensibly partitioned into relevant themes - the experience of the fighting men, the attempts by civilian helpers to build the nation, the various poisonous (and often fatal) power struggles between the Afghan leaders, and the corrupting nature of the war upon the Russian army. Above all, the writing is admirably clear, pacey, and informed by the very human sensibilities of its author. Altogether excellent.